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A B S T R A C T
Although donors generally aim to improve governance in recipient countries by various means, critics claim that
the aggregate eﬀect of large aid ﬂows is the deterioration of governance. Aid is said to weaken domestic ac-
countability, sustain authoritarian regimes, increase political instability, weaken government capacities, and
increase corruption. Conducting a systematic search in Web of Science, this paper reviews the empirical evidence
for these unintended aggregate eﬀects of aid on the political, administrative, and judicial dimensions of good
governance. It ﬁnds that the negative eﬀects of aid on governance are much exaggerated. The aggregate eﬀect of
aid on democracy has become more positive after the Cold War, and the eﬀect of aid on government capacity and
on reducing corruption has also improved over time. Furthermore, most studies show a positive eﬀect of aid on
political stability. These ﬁndings imply that donor intentions matter: donors that are serious about their intended
eﬀects on governance are able to mitigate the possible negative unintended eﬀects of their aid.
1. Introduction
From around 1990 onwards, good governance has increasingly be-
come an important objective for development cooperation. First, the
end of the Cold War reduced the need for aid propping up dictators like
Mobutu in Zaire or Marcos in the Philippines, in order to keep them
outside the communist sphere of inﬂuence. Donors began to expect
recipient countries to respect human rights and to set up institutions for
democratic accountability, and were willing to provide aid for sup-
porting these goals (Hoebink, 2006). Second, while in the 1980s donors
– in particular the IMF and World Bank – had promoted a neoliberal
agenda of deregulation and privatization as means toward economic
growth, they have subsequently come to realize that a well-functioning
market requires well-functioning state institutions (Fukuyama, 2016).
The World Bank and other donors began to promote public sector re-
forms as well as anti-corruption policies. While donors on the one hand
aim to support good governance by diﬀerent aid modalities such as
projects, technical assistance, or through the policy dialogue around
budget support and debt relief, on the other hand they have also used
good governance criteria for the aid allocation. However, the im-
plementation of this criterion has varied by donor and by period
(Dollar & Levin, 2006; Hout, 2007).
Yet, the sum of all aid to a particular country may also have eﬀects
on governance, and these aggregate eﬀects of aid are usually un-
anticipated and often unintended. Large aid ﬂows are often said to
weaken domestic accountability in recipient countries because execu-
tive governments are no longer dependent on the consent of
parliaments or of the population at large (Moyo, 2009; Moss,
Petterson, & Van de Walle, 2008; Sogge, 2002). Aid may also strengthen
authoritarian regimes directly by providing them resources for in-
creasing repression or for buying oﬀ potential opposition. Through the
weakening of domestic accountability, aid is often said to increase
corruption. And ﬁnally, the presence of many donors and large aid
volumes in a country may also have unintended negative eﬀects on
governance. The many diﬀerent projects with diﬀerent implementation
and reporting requirements distract the attention of government oﬃ-
cers from their regular planning and implementation activities, and
weaken state capacities (Acharya, De Lima, &Moore, 2006). Donors
have increasingly recognized these problems and this has led, for ex-
ample, to the 2005 Paris Declaration on aid eﬀectiveness, which ex-
presses commitments to increase recipient country ownership, increase
alignment to local priorities and local systems, and improve donor
harmonization and coordination (High Level Forum, 2005).
On the other hand, there can be positive unintended eﬀects of aid on
governance, for example when aid improves the education level in a
country or promotes international exchanges that lead to the adoption
of higher accountability and integrity standards. Ultimately, the ag-
gregate eﬀect of aid on good governance is therefore an empirical issue.
This paper aims to give an overview of the evidence on these aggregate
eﬀects of aid on governance. It reviews the ﬁndings of empirical studies
published between 1995 and 2016, and gives particular attention to
possible changes over time. As such, it is the ﬁrst systematic review to
examine the possible inﬂuence of the end of the Cold War (around
1990), the increased attention for state institutions and anti-corruption
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policies (starting in the early to mid-1990s), and the increased aware-
ness of the negative eﬀects of aid fragmentation and proliferation (from
around 2000 onward).
The paper focuses on aggregate eﬀects of aid, which means the ef-
fect of all aid in a particular recipient country. Good governance out-
comes are also analyzed at the country level. The possible aggregate
eﬀects of aid to a country are unintended by individual donors, and are
expected to appear or to become more serious when aid ﬂows are
“large.” The size of aid ﬂows must be considered in relation to the size
of the population or the economy of recipient countries.
In practice, most low-income countries, i.e., countries with an
average income per capita of less than US $1025, do receive large vo-
lumes of aid. On average, they received US $60 per capita during
2011–2014, which is higher than in previous decades. The average
share of aid in Gross National Income of this group of countries de-
creased in the past decade due to high economic growth rates, but is
still high, at 9% in 2014.
While several authors stress the unintended negative aggregate ef-
fects of aid, these eﬀects are often just postulated. This means that it is
important to examine the evidence. To what extent are the aggregate
eﬀects of aid indeed negative for governance, or is it possible that the
aggregate eﬀects are positive? This paper examines the evidence, and
concludes that the picture is not as negative as many aid critics and aid
observers claim. In addition, donor intentions and donor behavior
matter for mitigating these negative eﬀects. While there have been
improvements over time, there is certainly room for further improve-
ment.
The review analyzes the eﬀects of aid on three dimensions of good
governance, namely the political, administrative, and judicial dimen-
sions. Before discussing the empirical evidence, the paper ﬁrst deﬁnes
these three dimensions and discusses the hypotheses regarding the
aggregate eﬀects of aid on these dimensions. This is followed by a
presentation of the methodology for this review. The ﬁnal section
summarizes the evidence and discusses some policy implications.
2. Good governance and expected aggregate eﬀects
There is no universally accepted deﬁnition of what good governance
entails (Fukuyama, 2016). Sometimes, good governance refers only to
the eﬀective implementation of policies, and not to elements like de-
mocratic accountability or civil liberties. This would imply that there
can be good governance in dictatorships. Rothstein and Teorell (2008)
make a similar distinction between two dimensions of good govern-
ance, namely elements that concern (citizen’s) access to authority of a
state or nation, which would include democratic accountability, and
elements that concern the exercise of authority, thus referring to the
implementation side. Empirical research on good governance usually
distinguishes three dimensions: political, administrative, and judicial,
where the ﬁrst corresponds to access to authority and the latter two
refer to exercise of authority (Kaufmann, Kraay, &Mastruzzi, 2010;
Kwon & Kim, 2014).
In this paper, I follow that practice. The political dimension includes
issues like protection of civil rights, institutionalized checks and bal-
ances, press freedom, the possibility of replacing governments by
elections, and also political stability. Administrative governance is
about the capacity of governments to formulate and implement policies
eﬀectively, often also called “bureaucratic quality.” While Kaufmann
et al. (2010) present two indicators for this dimension, government
eﬀectiveness and regulatory quality, I consider the latter to be more an
indicator of regulatory policies, and not of governance. Judicial gov-
ernance is about respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that
govern economic and social interactions, such as laws, property rights,
and the judiciary itself. This can be measured by the indicators “rule of
law,” “law and order,” and “corruption” or “control of corruption.”
Aid dependence implies that governments are more accountable
outward, i.e. to donors, than inward, i.e. to parliaments or domestic
constituencies in general (Boekestijn, 2009; Moss et al., 2008; Sogge,
2002). This may weaken the political dimension of governance. Fur-
thermore, large aid ﬂows may have the perverse eﬀect of reducing tax
eﬀorts, which may further undermine state building. Historically,
taxation has been important in increasing the accountability and le-
gitimacy of executive powers. Increases in government revenues were
usually needed in times of war, inducing Charles Tilly to articulate his
famous saying, “the state made war, and war made the state” (quoted in
Moss et al., 2008, p. 272). Several authors claim that foreign aid plays
the same negative role as the availability of highly valued resources
such as oil (Djankov, Montalvo, & Reynal-Querol, 2008; Morrison,
2009). Countries with a resource curse, be it due to oil or aid abun-
dance, tend to have lower levels of democratic accountability. With
respect to the eﬀect of aid on political stability, Grossman (1992) has
argued that aid makes control of the state and aid resources more va-
luable and therefore increases the number of coup attempts and do-
mestic conﬂicts in general.
Yet, there may also be positive aggregate eﬀects of aid on democ-
racy and political stability. When aid leads to higher education levels or
more socio-economic development in general, it can be expected that
people will be more interested in and capable of participating in poli-
tical decision making, and will be less inclined to solve their disputes in
a violent way. Furthermore, aid may also reduce civil conﬂict by in-
creasing state capacity for repression, which acts as a deterrent.
Aid may reduce the administrative capacity in recipient countries,
especially if provided in high volumes and by many diﬀerent donors.
Morss (1984) has observed that the increase in the number of donors
since the 1970s and the change toward more project aid instead of
program aid1 led to “institutional destruction” in developing countries
and especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. This conclusion was based on
qualitative evidence from Lesotho, Malawi, and Zambia. More recent
authors have also highlighted the adverse eﬀects of government oﬃ-
cials’ having to deal with many donors and projects, all with their own
reporting and evaluation requirements. This not only means high
transaction costs but also leads to a fragmented development policy.
Donors are often only interested in the success of their own projects,
and not in the quality of governance in general or the success of other
donors' projects (Acharya et al., 2006). They provide technical assis-
tance in the form of training and seminars for relevant government
staﬀ, within the country or abroad, leading to high absenteeism among
government oﬃcers. Or, donors may set up separate implementation
units for the execution of their projects, hiring the best government staﬀ
and thus poaching staﬀ away from regular ministries (Acharya et al.,
2006; Wuyts, 1996). As O’Connor and Soludo wrote, “The aid re-
lationship can get stuck in a high aid-weak institutions equilibrium in
which institutions remain weak and graduation [i.e. from aid depen-
dence – gd] never occurs.” (O’Connell & Soludo, 2001, pp. 1548).
On the other hand, if donors manage to avoid aid fragmentation and
succeed in harmonizing aid practices under government leadership as
recommended by the Paris Declaration and subsequent high-level fora
on aid eﬀectiveness, this may mitigate the negative eﬀects of aid on
governance or even improve state capacities.
As in the other dimensions of governance, the theoretical aggregate
eﬀects of aid on the judicial dimension of governance can go both ways.
Aid can improve the rule of law and reduce corruption by setting rules and
conditions and by providing a good example, for example in procurement
activities for projects. Aid may also help reduce corruption by allowing
increased salaries of civil servants. On the other hand, aid may reduce
domestic accountability, and as a result it may disappear into the pockets
of high-level government oﬃcers. Furthermore, aid may foster patronage
and clientelism by facilitating the growth of public employment and of
public subsidies (Chabal &Daloz, 1999; Van de Walle, 2001).
1 Morss’s study deﬁnes program aid as aid to a sector and to large infrastructural
projects. The latter, however, is no longer part of the current deﬁnition of program aid.
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3. Methodology
In order to ﬁnd relevant papers, I conducted a search in the Web of
Science database with the following search terms: a combination of
‘“aid” or “foreign aid” or “development cooperation“ on the one hand,
and many diﬀerent terms for good governance on the other: govern-
ance, good governance, regime, authoritarian, democracy, dictatorship,
accountable government, accountability, bureaucratic quality, institu-
tions, institutional quality, institutional capacity, political stability,
conﬂict, civil war, rule of law, corruption. The search included studies
published between 1995 and 2016.
Criteria for inclusion included that the studies should present em-
pirical evidence on the relationship between aid and one or more
governance indicators related to the political, administrative, and ju-
dicial dimensions as deﬁned above. Since I was interested in the ag-
gregate eﬀects of aid, I excluded studies covering one donor or just one
or a few speciﬁc aid modalities, like governance aid, project aid, budget
support, or technical assistance. I also excluded studies dealing with the
eﬀects of aid volatility. While including the cross-country evidence on
the eﬀect of aid on political (in)stability, I excluded studies speciﬁcally
dealing with the eﬀect of aid in fragile states.
The empirical studies reviewed in this paper suﬀer from some
common limitations and weaknesses, and this to some extent also af-
fects the conclusions of the review. First, it is not easy to establish a
causal relationship between aid on the one hand and good governance
on the other. Aid is just one of many factors that may inﬂuence the
quality of governance in recipient countries, and probably a relatively
small factor. Econometric studies are to some extent able to control for
other possible factors, such as the level of development, economic
growth, and the presence of valuable natural resources. Yet there may
be other country-speciﬁc historical or other factors that are not in-
cluded in these studies, and this may create omitted-variable bias.
Furthermore, it is very diﬃcult to establish the direction of causality
and to exclude endogeneity. Aid may be provided because of bad gov-
ernance or because of improving governance. Both cases would distort
conclusions on the eﬀect of aid on governance, in diﬀerent directions.
Endogeneity would distort results if there were a third factor that in-
ﬂuenced both the amount of aid and the good-governance outcome.
This could be the rate of economic growth, for example. Simple or-
dinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis cannot deal with reverse
causality or endogeneity. For this reason, many studies instrument for
aid, meaning that they ﬁrst estimate aid ﬂows on the basis of factors
unrelated to governance outcomes, and then use the results of this ﬁrst
regression to estimate the impact of aid on governance. Studies that
attempt to deal with endogeneity and reverse causality can be expected
to have more valid outcomes.
A second weakness is the quality and validity of the data on good
governance. Most of the indicators for good governance are based on
perceptions, and often these are expert perceptions (Arndt & Oman,
2006). In the political dimension of governance, these perceptions may
have a more or less objective basis, for example if they assess the pre-
sence of institutions and procedures for citizens to express their pre-
ferences for policies and leaders, the presence of civil liberties, or the
extent of institutionalized constraints on executive power, to mention a
few dimensions used in the Polity IV index. However, expert opinions
are much more subjective when it comes to assessing the bureaucratic
quality of governments or the extent of corruption. Several authors
argue that perceptions on governance are often inﬂuenced by western
ideas, leading to lower assessment of government eﬀectiveness in South
Korea and Taiwan, for example (Kurtz & Schrank, 2007) and/or are
mixed up with policy outcomes (Grindle, 2004; Rothstein & Teorell,
2008) or ideas on good policies–which, in turn, are often also inﬂu-
enced by western ideas (Van Waeyenberghe, 2009). These factors
weaken the validity of results of virtually all presented studies, espe-
cially those for the judicial and administrative dimensions of govern-
ance.
Third, aid is provided for many diﬀerent reasons and in many forms.
We cannot expect all aid to have a development motivation. To the
extent that aid is provided for strategic, commercial, or other reasons
related to the donor’s own interest, its eﬀect on good governance will be
more negative. It can also be expected that aid modalities matter for
some of the negative unintended eﬀects of aid. If donors provide closely
monitored project aid for speciﬁc purposes, or only provide aid to non-
government organizations, some of the negative unintended eﬀects of
aid on the political and judicial dimensions of governance can be mi-
tigated. On the other hand, program aid is more likely than project aid
to mitigate the negative eﬀects on state capacities. These diﬀerences
will prove to be important for the outcomes of the studies presented in
this paper, and of course also for the policy implications.
4. Aid and the political dimension of governance
Goldsmith (2001) examines the impact of aid on democracy in
Africa over the years 1975–1997, using the Freedom House’s “Freedom
Index.” He concludes that aid had a small but signiﬁcant positive eﬀect
on democracy. Knack (2004) looks at a much larger sample of between
96 and 105 countries and examines the period from 1975 to 2000. He
observes that, according to both the Freedom House index and the
Polity IV index, many aid recipients experienced an increase in demo-
cratization. However, he ﬁnds that aid did not play any role in these
improvements, and this ﬁnding was robust to various model speciﬁca-
tions and to the use of exogenous instruments for aid.
Djankov et al. (2008) use the Polity IV index and an indicator for the
existence of checks and balances to estimate the eﬀect of aid on de-
mocracy. They control for oil income and apply many robustness checks
including using instruments for aid. For a sample of 108 countries they
ﬁnd that aid has a negative eﬀect on democracy during the period
1960–1999. The negative eﬀect of aid proves even larger than that of
oil. Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2012) also conclude that aid has a negative
impact on democracy in a sample of 64 aid recipient countries in the
period 1967–2002. They use a binary dependent variable: a country is
classiﬁed as democratic if both president and the legislature are elected.
Their ﬁndings are also robust to using instruments for aid. They also
examined under which conditions in the recipient country aid has a
negative eﬀect on democracy, and found that the eﬀect was larger in
countries with a low democratic status to begin with. On the other
hand, previous economic liberalization helps to soften the negative
eﬀect of aid on democracy.
Dutta, Leeson, and Williamson (2013) examine a similar hypothesis:
that aid promotes democratic development in countries that are already
democratic while the opposite is true in countries with dictatorial traits.
They analyze 124 countries for the period 1960–2009 using the Polity
IV index, and the results conﬁrm their hypothesis. The authors conclude
that aid has an “ampliﬁcation eﬀect”: it can reinforce certain paths, but
cannot put the country on another path. Abegaz (2015), in a case study
on Ethiopia, shows that aid focused on poverty reduction in a country
with limited civil liberties and weakly accountable state institutions
reinforces those tendencies.
Young and Sheehan (2014) examine the eﬀect of aid on several
measures for economic and political institutions for a large sample of
116 countries over the period 1970–2010. In simple OLS regressions
they ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of aid on democracy, but after instrumenting
for aid, the eﬀect becomes negative.
Several studies examine the eﬀect of aid on regime survival. Kono
and Montinola (2009) distinguish between current and cumulative aid,
where current aid is the annual aid ﬂow, and cumulative aid is aid
received over the period that a certain leader is in power. They ﬁnd that
cumulative aid is particularly beneﬁcial for autocratic leaders because
they can save aid resources to a larger extent then democracies can.
Annual aid ﬂows (current aid) are more beneﬁcial for democratic
governments because they will spend it in the same year. This means
that aid provided over a long term helps to maintain autocratic leaders
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in power.
Morrison (2009) postulates that aid and other nontax revenues are
important for regime survival of both democracies and autocracies. In
democracies, nontax revenue helps to buy oﬀ the elites by reducing the
need for taxation, while in autocracies aid can soften population pro-
tests by increasing social spending. He ﬁnds these hypotheses con-
ﬁrmed, implying that aid helps to maintain authoritarian regimes.
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) conclude that both aid and other
nontax revenue have a negative eﬀect on regime change. Ahmed (2012)
looks at the eﬀect of aid and remittances on regime change in author-
itarian states and similarly ﬁnds that both have a negative eﬀect, and
thus tend to sustain authoritarianism.
Overall, it seems that the conclusion is quite negative. Many studies
conclude that aid has a negative eﬀect on democratization, and some
add that this holds even more in non-democratic countries. Aid tends to
help autocrats to maintain their power. This is clearly an unintended
eﬀect of aid–at least for those donors that provide aid with a devel-
opment objective.
However, as is also argued above, aid is not always given from a
development perspective. Especially during the Cold War, many
countries received aid for strategic reasons, no matter whether they
were ruled by dictators. While strategic reasons have continued to play
a role after that, beneﬁting, for example, Israel and Egypt, and more
recently Pakistan and Afghanistan, it can be argued that during the Cold
War the number of authoritarian regimes receiving large amounts of aid
due to strategic reasons was larger than in the period after 1990. These
larger numbers matter when assessing the average eﬀect of aid on the
political dimension of governance–which is what cross-sectional
econometric studies do. Another factor that may have contributed to a
more positive eﬀect of aid on democratization after the Cold War is that
democratization began to ﬁgure more prominently among donors’ ob-
jectives.
Most of the above-mentioned studies cover a long period and in-
clude the Cold War years. And indeed, studies covering the period after
1990 often ﬁnd a more positive eﬀect. In addition, many of the above
studies that found insigniﬁcant or negative eﬀects of aid on democra-
tization have been replicated in order to test whether the end of the
Cold War makes a diﬀerence. The ﬁndings of these studies will now be
presented.
Dunning (2004) speciﬁcally looks at the impact of the Cold War by
reusing Goldsmith’s (2001) data but now comparing two periods:
1975–1987 and 1988–1997. He argues that the Soviet Union’s inﬂuence
in Africa was already waning around 1987 and that this also inﬂuenced
western donors’ attitudes from that year onward. He ﬁnds that there
was no signiﬁcant eﬀect of aid on democratic development before
1987, but that this relation became positive and signiﬁcant in the
second period.
Kersting and Kilby (2014) examine the long-run eﬀect of aid in a
cross-sectional study, replicating Knack’s (2004) study while adding
estimations for a longer time period (until 2007) and with a larger
number of recipient countries. The exact replication yields the same
insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient for democratization as in Knack (2004), but the
other models yield positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects of aid, showing that
aid did play a role in democratization of recipient countries over the
longer run. The results are robust for endogeneity and other tests.
Ear (2007) examines the eﬀect of aid on the diﬀerent World Gov-
ernance Indicators (WGIs) for the period 1996–2004. He does not ﬁnd
any signiﬁcant eﬀect, but the coeﬃcient on “voice and accountability”
is most positive, pointing to a positive eﬀect of aid on democracy.
Heckelman (2010) investigates the eﬀect of aid on democratization for
Eastern European transitional countries and also ﬁnds a positive eﬀect
for most of the sub-dimensions of democracy, for the period
1997–2007. More recently, Askarov and Doucouliagos (2013) ﬁnd a
similar positive eﬀect for the same group of countries, albeit with de-
clining returns to scale: above around US $193 in aid per capita, the
eﬀect of aid on democratization begins to decline, and becomes
negative above US $350.
Jones and Tarp (2016) use the Quality of Government (QoG) da-
tabase for investigating the eﬀect of aid on political and economic in-
stitutions, including democracy. They construct a synthetic measure of
the QoG indicators for democracy, number of veto players, executive
constraints, political terror, and judicial independence. They use sev-
eral estimation methods for a sample of 104 countries for the period
1983–2010, and systematically ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of aid on this
synthetic measure. When adding a dummy for the Cold War period, the
eﬀect becomes stronger.
Altunbas and Thornton (2014) also look at the eﬀect of aid on
several measures of democracy, including both the Polity IV and
Freedom House measures. They instrument for aid and use system
GMM as robustness test. Aid has a small but statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect on democracy over the period 1971–2010, and the size of the
eﬀect increases over time, pointing to a possible eﬀect of the end of the
Cold War.
Bermeo (2016) postulates that aid does not have the same eﬀect on
governments as oil, thus contradicting earlier authors such as Morrison
(2009) and Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010). While oil income is
always fungible for any type of regime, aid may be given in diﬀerent
modalities according to regime type. Donors will provide fungible aid to
democratic governments or to governments that are strategically im-
portant, and non-fungible aid to autocratic regimes that are not stra-
tegically important. She expects that aid will have a negative eﬀect on
democratization during the Cold War, and a positive eﬀect after that.
Furthermore, aid may still have a negative eﬀect on democratization
when recipient countries are strategically important. Both of these
hypotheses are conﬁrmed for a sample of 129 countries over the period
1973–2000. Given that the results are so diﬀerent from those of earlier
studies, she also replicates the studies by Morrison (2009), Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith (2010), and Ahmed (2012).2 It turns out that both
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, and Ahmed, did not report their ﬁndings
carefully enough: there proves to be a diﬀerence between oil and aid,
and between remittances and aid, such that the eﬀect of aid on regime
change is not signiﬁcant. For the Morrison study, the eﬀect of aid
proves to be positive in the post–Cold War period, while it was indeed
negative in the earlier years.3
Yet, there are some (few) studies that do not agree that using data
for prior to 1990 makes a diﬀerence, or that do not ﬁnd positive sig-
niﬁcant eﬀects for the period after the Cold War. For Brazys (2016), the
main question is to examine whether there are diminishing returns in
the relation between aid and governance. For the period 1995–2008,
aid proves to have a positive but diminishing eﬀect on the voice and
accountability measure of the World Governance Indicators. However,
this eﬀect becomes insigniﬁcant under GMM.
In 2015, Askarov and Doucouliagos published a meta-regression
analysis on the eﬀect of aid on governance, covering studies examining
its eﬀect on democracy and on administrative governance. Among
other things, they examined the eﬀect of the end of the Cold War on the
results. After an extensive search of published and non-published pa-
pers, they identiﬁed 25 quantitative studies on the eﬀect of aid on
democracy.4 The 25 studies produce 564 estimated eﬀects and, of these,
32% are positive and signiﬁcant and 26% are negative and signiﬁcant.
However, when only including estimates based on analyses that control
for endogeneity (instrumental variable analysis or GMM), only 10% of
2 Bermeo tried to replicate the et al., 2008Djankov et al. (2008) study as well, but data
proved to be unavailable (Bermeo, 2016, p. 21).
3 Making this distinction by period proved to be impossible for the Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith article due to the underlying structure of the data used.
4 Unlike the present review, these authors included non-published papers and studies
on speciﬁc types of aid, like technical assistance or project aid, and they excluded studies
that did not disclose full statistical information like estimated coeﬃcients, sample sizes,
and standard errors or t-statistics. The search was ﬁnished by mid-2012. For all of these
reasons the overlap between their selection and the selection in this review is limited.
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the results are positive and signiﬁcant and 63% are negative and sig-
niﬁcant. This conﬁrms the overall somewhat negative conclusion as
postulated above.
When examining the reasons for diﬀerent results, Askarov and
Doucouliagos (2015) ﬁnd that studies using data from before 1991 are
not more negative than studies using data after 1991. This contradicts
many of the studies presented here. However, they do ﬁnd that the
results become more positive over time. Other reasons for the hetero-
geneity in results include: (1) using the Freedom House indicator leads
to more positive results, using a binary variable as well; panel data
produce more positive results than cross-sectional analysis; and (2)
results for the transition countries are more positive than for Africa and
Asia. This latter ﬁnding is conﬁrmed in this review, as attested by the
more positive results generally found for Eastern European and former
Soviet transition countries than for Africa (below).
Dutta and Williamson (2016) examine the eﬀect of aid on one
speciﬁc indicator related to democracy, namely press freedom (from
Freedom House). For the period 1994–2010, and when instrumenting
for aid, they ﬁnd that aid has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on press freedom.
However, aid has a small positive eﬀect on press freedom in democ-
racies, but a small negative eﬀect in autocracies (measured with the
Polity II variable, the extent of checks and balances).
Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016) look at the eﬀect of aid on all of the
World Governance Indicators in 52 African countries for the period
1996–2010. They instrument for aid. In a panel regression analysis,
they ﬁnd no eﬀect of aid on the voice and accountability indicator–-
which is usually considered a measure of democracy. However, they
include democracy (level of institutionalized democracy, from World
Development Indicators) as a control variable as well. Not surprisingly,
this eﬀect is large and signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
In another study on Africa, Asongu (2015a) compares the eﬀects of
tax revenues with those of aid, testing the hypothesis that tax revenues
are important for improving domestic accountability while aid may
have the opposite eﬀect. Surprisingly, tax revenues do not have an ef-
fect on the voice and accountability indicator, while the eﬀect of aid is
negative and small in diﬀerence GMM, and neutral in system GMM. He
does ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of tax revenues on political stability and
concludes that this conﬁrms the hypothesis. However, political stability
is quite diﬀerent from domestic accountability. The same author applies
quantile regression analysis to examine whether the level of institu-
tional development matters for the eﬀect of aid in Africa. For the period
1996–2010 again, he ﬁnds that, at higher levels of democracy, the ef-
fect of aid is positive. However, this relationship only proves to hold for
the variable “level of institutionalized democracy” (Polity V) and not
for the WGI voice and accountability indicator.
The same study by Kersting and Kilby (2014), as discussed above,
also includes a short-run analysis with annual panel data, in which the
authors account for possible endogeneity in an original way. They ﬁrst
estimate whether the aid allocation by speciﬁc donors is inﬂuenced by
the level of democracy and/or by the strategic importance of a country,
measured as being a large recipient of US military aid. All major non-
autocratic donors prove to reward democratization, although some do
so conditionally on the country being of strategic importance. This
latter ﬁnding is used as input in the regressions estimating the eﬀect of
diﬀerent types of donors on a change in the democracy index one year
later. The authors conclude that aid from DAC donors has a positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the change in democracy, while this eﬀect is ne-
gative and signiﬁcant for autocratic donors, and positive but not sig-
niﬁcant for multilateral aid. They also ﬁnd that the positive eﬀect of aid
from DAC donors weakens if a country receives more than 33% of aid
from donors that do not reward democratization if a country is strate-
gically important. This means that there is an “incentive eﬀect” when
donors reward democratization no matter the strategic importance of a
recipient country.
In a similar vein, Bermeo (2011) examines whether the type of
donor matters for the eﬀect of aid on democratization. She shows that
aid from democratic donors has a positive eﬀect on democratic regime
change, while aid from autocratic donors has a negative eﬀect. This is
based on data from 87 countries and for the period 1992–2007. She
concludes that donor intentions matter for the eﬀect of aid on demo-
cratization.
All in all, it seems that the unintended aggregate negative eﬀects of
aid on democracy are much exaggerated. While the majority of studies
covering the period until 1990 reveal a negative eﬀect or no eﬀect, the
balance is on the positive side for the studies covering the period after
the Cold War–although perhaps somewhat less so for Africa. Taking the
more recent empirical studies into account, it is clear that donor in-
tentions matter for the eﬀect of aid on democracy in the sense that aid
tends to weaken democratization in countries that are strategically
important for donors.
4.1. Aid and political stability
There are a few case studies of African countries showing that do-
nors have done unintended political damage and have contributed to
civil conﬂict. In Lesotho, aid proved to strengthen bureaucratic state
power at the cost of the poor peasants for whose beneﬁt it was ori-
ginally intended (Ferguson, 1990). In Rwanda, aid in the early 1990s
proved to reinforce existing socioeconomic and ethnic inequalities. This
contributed to the “structural violence” that later erupted as real racial
violence, leading to one of the most brutal explosions of violence in
history in 1994 (Uvin, 1998). Van de Walle (2012) shows that donors in
the Mali of the years before the coup focused too much on the executive
branch of government, gave too little attention to mechanisms of hor-
izontal accountability, and turned a blind eye to already existing threats
to democracy.
Collier and Hoeﬄer (2002) examine the eﬀect of aid (and economic
policy) on the risk of the outbreak of civil war. They do not ﬁnd a direct
eﬀect, but do ﬁnd an indirect positive eﬀect of aid. Aid leads to an
increase in economic growth and to a reduction in dependence on ex-
ports of primary commodities. Both have been found to reduce the risk
of conﬂict. De Ree and Nillesen (2009) examine the eﬀect of aid both on
the onset of civil conﬂicts and on their continuation. In line with Collier
and Hoeﬄer (2002), they do not ﬁnd an eﬀect on the start of conﬂicts,
but they do conclude that aid has a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on
the continuation of civil conﬂict. They control for endogeneity and use
ﬁxed eﬀects to control for unobservable country characteristics.
Savun and Tirone (2012) examine the eﬀect of aid in combination
with economic shocks on the outbreak of civil wars. They hypothesize
that economic shocks make civil wars more likely due to three possible
channels: reduced government spending for social services, reduced
military expenditure (hence lower repression of insurgent factions), and
the reduced opportunity costs of civil wars. They measure shocks by
looking at a large decrease in the global agriculural raw materials index
in combination with high agricultural exports. On the basis of annual
panel data for aid-eligible countries from 1990 to 2004, they ﬁnd that
aid (received in the previous year) reduces civil wars in general, while
aid also reduces civil wars when there is an economic shock.
Kono, Montinola, and Verbon (2015) postulate that the eﬀect of aid
on civil unrest is diﬀerent in democracies than in autocracies. Aid will
have no eﬀect on unrest in democracies but will reduce unrest in au-
tocracies due to increased resources for repression and deterrence. Civil
unrest is deﬁned as the incidence of demonstrations, general strikes,
and violent demonstrations–all of a certain minimum volume. In a
panel regression analysis with a one-year lag for aid for 84 countries for
the period 1970–2007, they ﬁnd that aid reduces unrest in autocratic
countries, while there is indeed no eﬀect of aid in democracies. They
also test the assumed causal mechanism, and it proves to be conﬁrmed:
aid increases military spending in autocracies and not in democracies,
and increased military spending reduces unrest in autocracies and not
in democracies.
While the original hypothesis was that aid increases political
G. Dijkstra Evaluation and Program Planning 68 (2018) 225–232
229
instability due to the higher value of state resources, the cross-country
empirical studies do not support this claim. Some ﬁnd an indirect mi-
tigating eﬀect of aid on civil conﬂict through socio-economic devel-
opment or through reducing the eﬀects of economic shocks; others ﬁnd
such an indirect eﬀect through increased military spending and deter-
rence, especially in autocracies. Yet other studies ﬁnd a direct eﬀect on
reducing the chance of civil conﬂict or on the continuation of civil wars.
Overall, it appears that aid contributes to lessening domestic conﬂicts.
5. Aid and the administrative dimension of governance
Several authors have examined the eﬀect of aid on the quality of
governance. Knack (2001) ﬁnds for the period 1982–1995 that aid has a
negative eﬀect on bureaucratic quality, measured by the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) of the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group.
Knack and Rahman (2007) include a formal model showing that
“poaching” leads to a lower quality of domestic governance. Their
empirical tests conﬁrm that more aid fragmentation leads to a lower
bureaucratic quality in recipient countries. These studies instrument for
aid in order to control for possible endogeneity: aid may be induced by
low bureaucratic quality, or there may be another factor that causes
both aid and low bureaucratic quality.
Rajan and Subramanian (2007) conclude that aid has a negative
eﬀect on governance in an indirect way. They show that aid has a ne-
gative eﬀect on the growth of those industrial sectors that depend on
the quality of governance. Their study covers the period 1980–2000.
Coviello and Islam (2006) also examine the eﬀect of aid on bu-
reaucratic quality as measured by the ICRG. Contrary to the previously
mentioned studies, they do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect. They argue that
it is necessary to include country ﬁxed eﬀects, and that this may be the
reason for the negative eﬀects found in other studies. Ear (2007) comes
to a similar conclusion while using the six dimensions of the World
Governance Indicators for a sample of 155 countries and for the period
1996–2004. When using pooled time series in a cross-sectional model,
instrumenting for aid and taking into account ﬁxed country eﬀects,
there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect on government eﬀectiveness.
Selaya and Thiele (2012) distinguish between aid grants and aid
loans. For the period 1995–2005, they ﬁnd that grants have a negative
eﬀect on bureaucratic quality, while loans do not; the eﬀect of both aid
forms together is negative.
Brazys (2016) ﬁnds a positive but diminishing eﬀect of aid on bu-
reaucratic quality (ICRG) and government eﬀectiveness (WGI). He ex-
amines the period 1995–2008. However, these ﬁndings are not fully
robust, as the former is the result of an OLS regression alone, and the
latter of system GMM alone. Yet, they would be fully in line with the
assumptions underlying the Paris Declaration on aid eﬀectiveness. In
his quantile regression analysis for Africa, Asongu (2015b) ﬁnds that
the eﬀect of aid on government eﬀectiveness is more negative at higher
levels of government eﬀectiveness. But this study does not address
possible endogeneity. Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016) instrument for
aid in their study on African countries and ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of aid
on government eﬀectiveness.
Askarov and Doucouliagos (2013) look at the eﬀect of aid in tran-
sition countries (see above), not only on democracy, but also on other
variables measured by the World Governance Indicators. They do not
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect for any of these indicators.
All in all, the evidence of the cross-country empirical studies is not
unambiguous. Most studies covering earlier periods (until 1995, or until
2000) show that aid, in particular aid proliferation and fragmentation,
leads to a lowering of the quality of bureaucratic governance in de-
veloping countries, but some of these outcomes are contested by
Coviello and Islam (2006). Most studies covering a more recent period,
from around 1995 onward, conclude that there are no signiﬁcant eﬀects
of aid on government eﬀectiveness or bureaucratic quality. These latter
ﬁndings may point to some positive eﬀects of increasing donor
awareness of the negative eﬀects of aid fragmentation and proliferation.
6. Aid and the judicial dimension of governance
This section examines the cross-country evidence of the eﬀect of aid
on the two judicial sub-dimensions of good governance, rule of law and
(control of) corruption.
Svensson (2000) develops a model showing that under certain
conditions, in particular if countries’ populations are ethnically divided,
more government resources lead to less productive public spending due
to rent seeking. In an empirical analysis and instrumenting for aid, he
ﬁnds that aid increases corruption in countries with competing groups.
In other countries, he does not ﬁnd this negative eﬀect.
Knack (2001) examines the eﬀect of aid on ICRG measures of rule of
law and corruption. When instrumenting for aid, aid proves to dete-
riorate the rule of law and to increase corruption. Alesina and Weder
(1999) conclude that aid increases corruption. But they only look at
bilateral ﬂows and do not instrument for aid, so they cannot exclude a
reverse relationship. Tavares (2003) uses the same indicator for cor-
ruption and ﬁnds for a longer time period that aid decreases corruption.
He includes bilateral and multilateral ODA and does instrument for aid.
Coviello and Islam (2006) also examine the eﬀect of aid on the rule of
law and corruption indicators of the ICRG and ﬁnd no signiﬁcant ef-
fects. As mentioned above, they include country ﬁxed eﬀects and argue
that when this method is applied to the earlier studies of, for example,
Knack (2001) and Tavares (2003), the signiﬁcant (negative or positive)
eﬀects of aid vanish.
Braütigam and Knack (2004) look at the eﬀect of aid on an average
of the ICRG measures for bureaucratic quality, corruption, and rule of
law in 32 African countries. They ﬁnd a negative eﬀect for the period
1982–1997. They also examine whether the eﬀect is more positive for
the period after 1990, assuming that donors began to allocate more
resources and eﬀorts in improving governance in recipient countries.
However, they do not ﬁnd any diﬀerence between the two periods.
Busse and Gröning (2009) use a similar composite governance in-
dicator, namely the average of ICRG scores for bureaucratic quality,
corruption, and law and order. They take a somewhat longer time
period into account, 1984–2004, and ﬁnd a small but statistically sig-
niﬁcant negative eﬀect of aid.
Two studies on this topic use Quantile Regression analysis. This
allows for diﬀerentiating the eﬀect of aid for countries with lower
versus higher levels of corruption. Okada and Samreth (2012) ﬁnd that
aid reduces corruption and that the eﬀect is stronger at lower levels of
corruption. They examine the period 1995–2009 for 120 developing
countries. When looking at groups of donors, they establish that it is
multilateral aid in particular that reduces corruption; bilateral aid has
no eﬀect. Mohamed, Kaliappan, Ismail, and Azman-Saini (2015) look at
Sub-Saharan African countries for the period 2000–2010 and do not
ﬁnd any eﬀects of aid, multilateral or bilateral. However, in both of
these studies it is not clear how the authors have dealt with endogeneity
or reverse causality.
Young and Sheehan (2014) examine the eﬀect of aid on one of the
components of the Freedom House Index, namely the protection of
property rights. This is an important aspect of the rule of law. When
looking at the years 1970–2010, thus including the Cold War period,
and instrumenting for aid, they ﬁnd that aid has a negative eﬀect on
this indicator. The above-mentioned study by Ear (2007) uses the WFGI
indicators for rule of law and control of corruption. It ﬁnds no eﬀect on
corruption, but a weakly signiﬁcant (at 10%) negative eﬀect of aid on
the rule of law for the period 1996–2004.
Like Braütigam and Knack (2004), Charron (2011) also assumes that
the time period makes a diﬀerence for examining the eﬀect of aid on
corruption. Around the mid-1990s, many international organizations,
most notably the OECD, the World Bank, and the IMF, began an “anti-
corruption movement.” He argues that this may have changed recipient
countries’ behavior. He uses panel data for 82 developing countries for
two periods, 1986–1996 and 1997–2007. With the same ICRG indicator
for corruption, he ﬁnds that bilateral aid never has an eﬀect on
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corruption, while for multilateral aid there was a clear diﬀerence be-
tween the two periods: after 1997 multilateral aid proves to have de-
creased corruption. He applies GMM system estimators and 2SLS to
control for endogeneity (Charon, 2011).
Finally, Menard and Weill (2016) examine the two directions of
possible causality between aid and corruption via Granger causality
tests using a GMM dynamic panel system. They investigate the period
1996–2009 for 71 countries and use the corruption indicator from the
WGI. They focus on short-run eﬀects and ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects of
aid, either for multilateral or bilateral aid separately, or for aid to
certain regions.
Overall, there is little proof that aid ﬂows systematically lead to an
increase in corruption. As with the other dimensions of good govern-
ance, it is very diﬃcult to disentangle the eﬀect of aid from the reverse
eﬀect, and results appear to depend largely on samples, data, time
periods, and estimation methods.
7. Conclusion
The relation between aid and good governance is multifaceted.
Donors usually are of the opinion that good governance is both an aim
in itself and an instrument for enhancing development. As a result, they
use good governance indicators as selection criteria in aid allocation
and attempt to improve governance through speciﬁc projects or by
having a policy dialogue with recipient governments. For all those
reasons, one would expect that, on average, aid would improve gov-
ernance. Yet, many authors claim that aid, and especially large aid
ﬂows in relation to the recipient economies, tends to cause a dete-
rioration of governance. Aid leads to weakened domestic accountability
and to more corruption. It tends to maintain authoritarian regimes and
to promote political instability. The presence of many donors and
projects undermines government capacities for policy making and
policy implementation. This means that it is an empirical issue whether
the intended positive eﬀects or the unintended negative eﬀects of aid on
governance dominate.
This paper reviews the empirical evidence on the aggregate eﬀects
of aid on good governance. As with the relation between aid and eco-
nomic growth, the empirical analysis of this relationship is riddled with
problems. Aid is only one of the factors inﬂuencing governance, and it
is very diﬃcult to deal with possible endogeneity and reverse causation.
In addition, aid is heterogeneous: it may be given for other than de-
velopment reasons, and it is more or less fungible. Finally, indicators for
governance may be subjective, especially for the judicial and adminis-
trative dimensions of governance. As a result of these problems, it is not
unsurprising that we ﬁnd many diﬀerent and contradictory results for
the eﬀect of aid on governance. Nevertheless, some conclusions are
possible.
In general, the negative unintended eﬀects of aid on governance are
much exaggerated for all three dimensions. For the relation between aid
and democracy, the end of the Cold War seems to have had a positive
inﬂuence on the aggregate outcomes. While before 1990 the eﬀect of
aid on democracy was negative or non-existent, after 1990 aid has, on
average, strengthened democratization in recipient countries—with the
possible exception of countries that are strategically important for do-
nors. Most studies show that aid reduces the chances of domestic con-
ﬂict, although sometimes through the channel of increased (threat of)
repression.
The studies of the aggregate eﬀect of aid on the administrative di-
mension of governance also point to slightly improving results over
time. Studies covering a more recent period are more positive than
studies dealing with periods until 1995 or until 2000. This may imply
that increased donor awareness of the negative eﬀects of donor pro-
liferation and donor fragmentation has had a positive inﬂuence on
governance outcomes. Finally, in the judicial dimension of governance,
studies do not show consistent outcomes. Yet, there is no systematic
evidence that aid increases corruption. In this area there is also some
evidence that the time period and thus donor intentions matter for the
outcomes. When, in particular, multilateral donors became more ser-
ious about combating corruption, the results become more positive.
From these conclusions, some policy implications can be drawn. In
general, it is clear that donor intentions can make a diﬀerence for the
aggregate eﬀects of aid on governance. Donors that are serious about
their intended eﬀects on, for example, democratization, corruption, or
mitigating the negative eﬀects of donor proliferation are able to de-
crease possible negative unintended eﬀects.
In order to enhance positive eﬀects of aid on democracy, donors can
reduce aid, and in particular highly fungible aid, to authoritarian re-
gimes. However, there appears to be somewhat of a trade-oﬀ between
the democracy and the political stability objective within this dimen-
sion, to the extent that aid to authoritarian regimes may help to
maintain stability through increased military spending.
For the aggregate eﬀects of aid for the administrative dimension of
governance, it is clear that donor behavior can reduce the negative
eﬀects. For this reason, donors and recipients alike have agreed to
principles like alignment and harmonization. Bigsten and Tengstam
(2015) estimate the beneﬁts from improved donor coordination and
from providing more resources in the form of budget support, and they
prove to be substantial. However, the evaluation of the implementation
of these principles has shown that there is still a lot to be improved,
especially on the donor side (Wood et al., 2011). More seriously, it
seems that in recent years the situation is deteriorating. There is an
increasing number of non-DAC donors such as China, Brazil, and Ve-
nezuela, as well as an increasing number of other aid agencies (vertical
funds, private foundations) and NGOs, that are less committed to the
Paris Declaration. At the same time, many DAC donors are backtracking
from the Paris Declaration principles. These developments may increase
the negative unintended eﬀects of aid on governance again.
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